Is There a Desirable Rate of Inflation? A Theoretical and Empirical Survey by Shiratsuka, Shigenori
49





Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: shigenori.shiratsuka@ boj.or.jp)
I would like to thank Yukinobu Kitamura and Michael Bryan for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to
Hiroshi Fujiki, Hitoshi Mio, and Toyoichiro Shirota for their assistance. The views expressed herein are my own 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies.
MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2001
In this paper, I survey the existing literature and examine three related questions: 
(1) What inflation rate constitutes the appropriate target for the central bank? 
(2) What is an operational definition of price stability for the conduct of monetary 
policy? (3) What is the policy framework for pursuing price stability in practice? 
In doing so, I emphasize that it is crucially important for a central bank to seek to 
maintain a price environment that is neither inflationary nor deflationary and is 
consistent with stability of the economy in the long run. I propose two definitions of 
price stability, “measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.” I argue that
“sustainable price stability” should be the fundamental goal for monetary policy.
Although, from the viewpoint of accountability, “measured price stability” is important 
as a quantitative yardstick by which to evaluate policy achievement, it should not be 
the justification for preventing the central bank from its pursuit of “sustainable price 
stability.” Since observed changes in price indices are affected by various types of external
shocks and measurement errors, it is indeed quite difficult to assess whether the 
underlying rate of inflation is stable or not. Therefore, even if “measured price stability”
seems to be maintained, a central bank may need to alter interest rates promptly if it
judges that the maintenance of “sustainable price stability” is at risk. In this sense, it is
deemed important to construct a framework for monetary policy designed to maintain
policy flexibility with a high degree of transparency by properly ensuring consistency
between “measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.” The current policy
framework adopted by the Bank of Japan can be viewed as aiming at a kind of 
“constrained discretion” by restricting pure discretion under open independence in line
with this direction.
Key words: Ultimate objective of monetary policy; Welfare costs of inflation and 
deflation; Measured price stability; Sustainable price stability; Constrained
discretionI. Introduction
Article 2 of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) Law stipulates that “Currency and monetary
control shall be aimed at, through the pursuit of price stability, contributing to the
sound development of the national economy.” In general, the above philosophy of
the Bank of Japan Law is regarded as meaning that the BOJ “pursues price stability to
achieve sound development of the national economy.” More precisely, although there
exists a trade-off between price stability and output (or employment) stability in the
short run, such a trade-off will disappear in the long run.
1 In other words, monetary
policy makes its best contribution to economic growth and employment by keeping
inflation low and stable.
However, the practical interpretation of price stability, which includes items such
as the scope and criterion of price stability, is not explicitly defined in the Bank of
Japan Law, and, thus, a consensus has yet to be gained as to how to transform it into
the practice of monetary policy. For example, in Japan, there is active debate con-
cerning the introduction of inflation targeting. Some proponents of inflation 
targeting argue that a numerical definition of price stability, such as a “specific 
value of a specific price index,” will improve the accountability and transparency of
monetary policy.
The question of what “price stability” is, even though it is a fundamental question
for monetary policy, is not necessarily an easy one to answer clearly in practice. In fact,
changes in actual price indices—the consumer price index (CPI), the wholesale price
index (WPI), and the GDP deflator—are affected by various types of temporary
shocks and measurement errors, making it quite difficult to gauge the underlying 
inflation trend. For example, it might be the case that statistically measured inflation
appears highly volatile at a glance, while most of the effects are just temporary. On the
contrary, it might also be the case that measured inflation remains stable, even though
the changed underlying inflation trend is offset by temporary shocks. Furthermore, the
magnitude of measurement errors in price indices is likely to vary according to the 
current economic conditions and the pace of technological innovation.
If one accepts that “price stability” does not always correspond to the achievement
of a specific rate of inflation in a specific price index, the question of “whether it is
appropriate to express a desirable state of price development as a specific value of a
specific price index” is not necessarily an easy one to answer clearly. In this sense, it is
worthwhile examining the practical way of thinking on “price stability” in detail to
improve the transparency of monetary policy. In this paper, I survey the existing 
literature and examine three related questions: (1) What inflation rate constitutes the
appropriate target for the central bank? (2) What is an operational definition of price
stability for the conduct of monetary policy? (3) What is the policy framework for
pursuing price stability in practice? 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the benefits of price 
stability, and Section III provides a selective survey of the existing literature on the
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1. See Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (2000), for the discussion on legal interpretations
of price stability in the Bank of Japan Law.welfare costs of inflation, disinflation, and deflation. Then, Section IV examines what
the desirable rate of inflation is from the viewpoint of monetary policy conduct and 
proposes two views on price stability, i.e., “measured price stability” and “sustainable
price stability.” Section V explores the importance of constructing a framework for
monetary policy designed to ensure consistency between these two views on price 
stability from the viewpoints both of the accountability of monetary policy and of
economic stability. Section VI concludes the paper. Appendixes provide some empiri-
cal evidence on the cost of inflation in Japan: Appendix 1 estimates the long-run
money demand function to compute “shoe leather” cost; and Appendix 2 examines
the relationship between relative price fluctuations and the rate of inflation. 
II. Benefits of Price Stability
In the following two sections, I review the existing academic literature on the welfare
costs of inflation and deflation to examine why price stability is desirable.
A. Expectation Formation and the Rate of Inflation
In the economy where the principle of “classical dichotomy” holds, real variables do
not depend on nominal variables, such as the money supply and the general price
level. Thus, an increase in real labor productivity, which directly affects social welfare,
is determined by capital accumulation and technological progress, and is unaffected
by changes in the rate of inflation. This implies that aggregate price fluctuations are
neutral with respect to social welfare.
2
Indeed, Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Chairman Greenspan refers to price stability
as being a state in which “economic agents no longer take account of the prospective
change in the general price level in their economic decision making” (Greenspan
[1996]). This definition can be interpreted as indicating the importance of attaining
the state of classical dichotomy in which price fluctuations do not affect the decision
making of economic agents regarding resource allocation. On a more realistic 
basis, inflation is probably not strictly neutral; price stability, however, minimizes 
distortions in the economy, thereby promoting sustainable economic growth.
Then, does the impact of inflation on the decision making of economic agents
vary in accordance with the rate of inflation? Figure 1 plots the relationship of 
people’s perceptions concerning inflation to the rate of inflation itself. This figure
suggests that private perceptions of inflation remain stable until the rate of inflation
reaches some critical level, while such perceptions change rapidly once the rate of
inflation exceeds the critical level. 
51
Is There a Desirable Rate of Inflation? A Theoretical and Empirical Survey
2. For example, Lucas (1987) states that “a society can use monetary and fiscal policy to attain any average inflation
rate it wants,” and that “[l]ong-run price stability is one of the few legitimate ‘free lunches’ economics has 
discovered in 200 years of trying.” In other words, the rise and fall of the average inflation rate affects the decision-
making of private agents, thereby inducing distortions of resource allocation in the economy. Thus, a society can
achieve the most efficient resource allocation by guiding the average rate of inflation to a rate that is neutral with
regard to the decision-making of private agents.B. Inflation as a Source of Welfare Loss
Why do aggregate price fluctuations affect resource allocations in the economy, 
and, as a result, lower social welfare? In considering this question, it is important to
understand the dynamic nature of decision making. Economic activity often consists
of various nominally denominated economic contracts (either explicit or implicit).
Therefore, if the general price level changes, real economic values will change, result-
ing in unplanned redistribution of income between the parties concerned. However,
at the same time, the risk of future changes in inflation, and hence in real economic
values, increases.
Unanticipated inflation causes unintended redistribution of both income and risk.
Moreover, the increase in unexpected inflation introduces additional uncertainty
about future prices, thereby raising interest rates by increasing the risk premium. As a
result, the distortion of resource allocation induces welfare loss in the economy. Even
anticipated inflation, however, affects resource allocation to some extent. This is
because social and economic systems are nonneutral with respect to inflation.
Therefore, inflation inevitably induces some welfare costs whether it is anticipated or
not, even though the magnitude and mechanism of the costs differ.
The aforementioned adverse effects of inflation-induced distortion in the economy
could in principle be reduced by indexing economic contracts to offset the risk of 
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prices, since the index is designed to increase, as inflation becomes lower.
Sources: Cabinet Office,  Consumer Confidence Survey; Ministry of Public Management, 
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer Price Index.
3 percent CPI inflation
Figure 1  Rate of Inflation and Consumers’ Perceptionfluctuations in the general price level. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that there
will be a wholescale shift to indexed economic systems, and nominal contracts will 
continue to dominate. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that achieving and 
maintaining a stable general price level is the most practical way to reduce the social
costs of inflation.
3
III. Welfare Costs of Inflation and Deflation
In this section, I summarize in turn the issues involved in the social costs of inflation,
disinflation, and deflation.
4
As aforementioned, the sources and mechanisms of the costs of inflation differ,
depending on whether inflation is anticipated or not. As Blinder (1987) points 
out, the important point is that “the costs of inflation depend very much on 
whether it proceeds at a steady, predictable rate or is volatile and takes people by 
surprise.” In the following, I examine the costs of inflation in the cases of both 
“predictable” and “surprising” rates. I then go on to explore the social costs of 
disinflation and deflation.
5
A. Costs of Inflation
First, let me consider the case of anticipated inflation where the rate of inflation is
moderate and stable over time, and assume that people can generally predict the
future course of inflation. Under these circumstances, academic literature emphasizes
“shoe leather” cost, menu cost, and the nonneutrality of tax systems with regard 
to inflation.
6
On the one hand, the former two costs (“shoe leather” cost and menu cost) arise
from the allocation of scarce resources to unproductive activities, thereby lowering
economic efficiency. The latter cost (tax system), on the other hand, arises because
inflation induces distortion in resource allocation by affecting the decision making
with regard to investments. 
1. “Shoe leather” cost and the opportunity costs of money holdings
Since nominal interest rates generally increase due to the Fisher effect as inflation
rises,
7 people have a greater incentive to save cash balances that yield no interest 
earnings. Consequently, people try to reduce their cash holdings by making frequent
trips to banks to withdraw their deposits. This cost is metaphorically called “shoe
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3. For example, Feldstein (1997) emphasizes that while a fully indexed tax system would in theory be possible, such 
a system design is not legislatively and administratively feasible. He then concludes that indexation cannot be a
practical alternative to reducing inflation.
4. If the desirable rate of inflation is not zero but some positive value, the rate of inflation lower than that desirable
rate will incur social costs. In the following, these kinds of costs are included in the costs of deflation. 
5. There are a number of major survey articles on the costs of inflation, including Driffill, Mizon, and Ulph (1990),
and Briault (1995). Issing (2000) also provides a useful discussion on this issue with emphasis on its implications
for monetary policy. 
6. In addition to the social costs examined here, the effects of increased uncertainty are often pointed out. Kimura
and Tanemura (2000b) estimate the CPI inflation rate that minimizes inflation uncertainty, i.e., inflation 
volatility, at around 1 percent.
7. The Fisher effect assumes the one-for-one influence of expected inflation on the nominal interest rate, because 
the nominal interest rate is the sum of the real interest rate and expected inflation.leather” cost because frequent trips to banks make people’s shoes wear down faster
than would otherwise be the case.
The question we have to examine here is whether this cost will be serious even at 
a moderate rate of inflation. There is a large quantity of empirical literature on 
quantitative evaluations of “shoe leather” cost obtained by computing the changes in
consumers’ surplus with a money demand function, stemming from the contribution
of Bailey (1956). More concretely, Figure 2 shows the “dead weight loss” which is 
produced by higher nominal short-term interest rates, as an approximation to the
“shoe leather” costs.
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8. I compute welfare gains when the nominal short-term interest rate was lowered from 12.5 percent to 2.5 percent by
assuming that the equilibrium real short-term interest rate is equal to 2.5 percent, based on the estimation of Mori,
Shiratsuka, and Taguchi (2001) based on long-term historical data for Japan. It should be noted, however, that
changes in the equilibrium short-term interest rate hardly affect the magnitude of welfare gains, since the welfare
gain varies in an almost linear fashion with regard to the interest rate due to low interest rate elasticity in Japan.














Figure 2  Estimation of “Shoe Leather” Cost
Employing the analytical framework of Lucas (2000), I estimate the “shoe leather”
cost in Japan (see Appendix 1 for the details). More precisely, I quantitatively evaluate
the magnitude of “shoe leather” cost by estimating the money demand function, which
explains the ratio of real money balances (M1 base) to real income in terms of the
nominal short-term interest rate, using long-range historical data from 1885 to 1999.
The estimation results show that the welfare gain from a 10 percent decline in the rate
of inflation is just 0.3 percent of real GDP, because interest rate elasticity with regard
to money demand is quite low in Japan.
8 By contrast, the estimation results in Lucas(2000), which uses the U.S. data for 1900–94, show that the welfare gain from a 
10 percent reduction in inflation is equivalent to an increase in real GDP of slightly
less than 1 percent. However, it should be noted that such estimation results are very
sensitive to the specifications of money demand function and/or utility function.
9
2. Menu cost and relative price fluctuations
The menu cost associated with inflation refers metaphorically to the additional cost
incurred by the necessity of printing and distributing new catalogues and price lists
whenever price revisions take place. Since menu cost can lead to significant stickiness
in nominal price adjustment, money is nonneutral to real economic activity in the
short run.
As a clue to the effects of menu costs on social welfare, let me now explore 
empirically the relationship between relative price variability and the rate of inflation.
A fundamental function of a price system is to transmit the necessary information 
for resource allocation in the economy efficiently. Although the relevant information
in this case is not absolute prices but relative prices, it should be noted that all the
information in practice is provided in the form of absolute prices.
10 However, under
the existence of menu cost and positive trend inflation, as Ball and Mankiw 
(1994) suggest, positive shocks to firms’ desired prices trigger greater adjustment 
than do negative shocks of the same size, thus leading to excessive fluctuations in 
relative prices.
11
The upper panel of Figure 3 is a scatter diagram showing, from January 1971 to
April 2000, on the horizontal axis, the CPI inflation from a year earlier, and, on the
vertical axis, the weighted standard deviation of individual item inflation rates as a
proxy for relative price variability.
12 This diagram shows that there is a positive 
correlation between the rate of inflation and its standard deviation. However, if one
divides the sample into two by setting the border rate of inflation at 3 percent, this
positive correlation becomes insignificant in the subsample of inflation rates below 
3 percent.
13 This result suggests a possibility that it becomes difficult to distinguish
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9. Sinn (1999) comments on the estimation results in Lucas (2000), which show that welfare costs will decline
markedly if one takes into account the effects of transaction costs and interest income tax. Attanasio, Guiso, and
Jappelli (1998) employ individual household data in Italy regarding the usage of ATMs to estimate the welfare
costs of reducing cash balances as being less than 0.1 percent of real GDP. On the contrary, Dotsey and Ireland
(1996) take a general equilibrium approach to assess the welfare costs of inflation by considering the effects on
time allocation and human capital accumulation, in addition to “shoe leather” cost. They then point out that 
welfare costs reach 1.08 percent of real GDP for 4 percent inflation, and 1.73 percent for 10 percent inflation.
10. Friedman (1977) emphasizes that although the relevant information with regard to the price mechanism is 
relative prices, highly volatile general prices make it difficult to extract an indicator of relative prices from
absolute prices, because the information is in practice transmitted in the form of absolute prices.
11. Looking at the relationship between the rate of inflation and the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of 
individual price changes in the CPI, the shape of the distribution skews to the right under high inflation, while
the shape of the distribution skews to the left under low inflation. There are two models to explain why the shape
of the cross-sectional distribution of individual price changes is asymmetric: (1) a model that assumes the 
existence of menu cost and asymmetric price shocks (Ball and Mankiw [1995]); and (2) a model that assumes 
the accumulative influence of sectoral shocks (Balke and Wynne [1996, 2000]). For the details on these points,
see Shiratsuka (1997) and Mio and Higo (1999).
12. I use disaggregated CPI data in 88 categories, which are continuously available retroactively to 1970. The 
measures of overall CPI inflation and relative price variability are respectively calculated as a weighted average of
individual items, and its weighted standard deviation. See Shiratsuka (1997) for details of this data.
13. Ball and Mankiw (1994) show that the asymmetric response of relative prices to external shocks disappears when
the rate of inflation becomes high.relative price fluctuations from changes in general price level when inflation reaches 
a certain rate.
14
In this regard, the critical rate of inflation at which the correlation between 
relative price fluctuations and the rate of inflation becomes significant needs to be
determined. More precisely, I thus estimate repeatedly for the equation that explains
the relationship between relative price variability and the rate of inflation, by moving
up the border rate of inflation gradually within the sample period from January 1971
to April 2000 (see Appendix 2 for the details). 
The estimation results can be summarized as follows: (1) the CPI inflation rate
that corresponds to the rate at which the positive relationship between the CPI 
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14. Although this analysis focuses only on the current prices of goods and services for consumers, this type of 
analysis should essentially cover all the relative prices in the economy, ranging from current prices of raw and
intermediate materials and other factor prices, such as wages, to future prices of such products.
Source: Author’s calculation using Consumer Price Index (Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications).inflation rate and relative price variability becomes statistically significant is estimated
at 2.7 percent; and (2) the CPI inflation rate that corresponds to the rate at which 
the difference between higher and lower inflation samples becomes statistically
insignificant is 5.6 percent. Although these estimation results vary slightly depending
on the sample period chosen, the general conclusion that the former critical 
inflation rate is around 3 percent and the latter critical inflation rate is 5 to 6 percent
remains unchanged. 
3. The nonneutrality of taxation with regard to inflation
In recent years, it has been emphasized that even anticipated and relatively low rates
of inflation provoke substantial welfare losses to the economy, because their cumula-
tive effects distort economic decision making and resource allocation significantly in
the long run.
15 The most important source is the interaction of inflation with the tax
system, which is nonneutral to the level of inflation, due to the absence of complete
indexation.
16 In fact, the cumulative effects of past inflation erode the tax benefits,
leading to tax-related distortions across taxable items and methods of taxation. As a
result, even low or moderate levels of inflation produce serious distortion by reducing
the optimal level of investment and incentives to work. 
For example, Feldstein (1999) estimates the social gains of reducing inflation by 
2 percentage points (from 2 percent to zero) to be 0.76–1.04 percent per year as a
ratio to real GDP. He also argues that such social gains are sure to outweigh the cost
of reducing inflation, considering that the social gains of reducing inflation should be
evaluated as the discounted present value of the permanent benefits of price stability.
More precisely, Feldstein (1999) points out that just 0.16 percent of real GDP as the
annual benefit of lower inflation corresponds to the upper limit of the “one-time”
cost of reducing inflation, ranging from 4 to 6 percent, with a relatively high real 
discount rate, which is computed as the subtraction of the average rate of real 
economic growth (2.5 percent) in 1970–94 from the real net-of-tax return from
stock investment (5.1 percent). 
4. The cost of hyperinflation
Nobody denies that hyperinflation is extremely costly to the economy, as evidenced 
by the recent poor economic performance in countries that have experienced 
hyperinflation.
Hyperinflation produces tremendous costs because economic agents start using
huge amounts of resources to avoid the adverse effects of hyperinflation, instead of
more productive activities, such as production and investment. In fact, although
“shoe leather” and menu costs are not so apparent when inflation remains moderate,
such costs become serious under hyperinflation. “Shoe leather” costs become large,
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15. A literature on the monetary growth model starting with Tobin (1965) explores the long-run effects of inflation on
resource allocation. In this literature, the mechanism of the “Tobin effect” is examined in detail. That is, higher
inflation increases the opportunity cost of holding money, inducing a portfolio shift from financial assets to real
assets, thereby leading to higher economic growth in the long run. However, Orphanides and Solow (1990), who
provide a comprehensive survey of this issue, point out that it is difficult to assess the practical relevance of the
“Tobin effect” because slight differences in the setup of theoretical models yield quite different conclusions. 
16. Feldstein (1997, 1999) emphasizes the effects of capital income taxes as a mechanism by which the tax system
becomes nonneutral to inflation. Since the real effective tax rate rises as inflation increases, households are 
motivated to consume earlier, distorting intertemporal resource allocation.because cash loses its value very quickly under hyperinflation and people devote
much time and effort to save cash balances. Menu costs are also serious, because
maintaining the current price level automatically implies a large decline in relative
prices, leading to a higher incentive to change prices more frequently.
Moreover, the costs of hyperinflation undermine the credibility of long-term 
contracts, and adversely affect economic decision making in the long run. Higher
inflation increases the uncertainty of relative prices as well as the future general 
price level. As a result, a risk premium for long-term interest rate increases, and
intertemporal resource allocation is misguided. In addition, the functioning of 
financial intermediation, which plays an important role in intertemporal resource
allocation, is weakened.
The costs of inflation lower productivity growth, thereby leading to a lower rate
of economic growth. Taking account of the fact that inflation is determined by the
interaction of various factors, empirical evidence that links inflation with overall 
economic performance is not particularly robust. Still, some empirical studies 
are available that show a negative correlation between the rate of inflation and 
the rate of economic growth (Fischer [1993], Judson and Orphanides [1996], and
Barro [1997]). These empirical studies indicate that price stability is one of the 
fundamental bases for achieving favorable economic performance in the long run.
B. The Cost of Disinflation
Another point that should be emphasized regarding the costs of inflation is that 
disinflation is highly likely to be associated with significant social costs. As the 
empirical literature on the “sacrifice ratio” shows, reduction of the rate of inflation
from a once-increased level is costly in terms of both lost output and employment.
17
Furthermore, these costs become larger as the rate of inflation rises. Therefore, it is
deemed important to sustain price stability to avoid the cost of disinflation being
incurred once price stability is achieved. 
C. The Cost of Deflation
There is a growing consensus that deflation is potentially more costly than inflation,
even though the costs of inflation are significant.
18
1. Downward rigidity of nominal wages
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) point out that downward rigidity in nominal
wages may prevent the smooth adjustment of real wages under a very low rate of
inflation. This impediment to real wage adjustment is likely to hamper reallocation
of the labor force across sectors and areas, thereby leading to an increased equilibrium
unemployment rate. 
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17. Ball (1994) conducts a cross-country study on the sacrifice ratio, and points out that (1) the sacrifice ratio is
decreasing in line with the speed of disinflation (the ratio of the change in trend inflation to the duration of 
disinflation episode); and (2) the sacrifice ratio is lower in countries with more flexible labor contracts.
18. For example, Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 30) state that “undershooting a zero inflation target (i.e., deflation) 
is potentially more costly than overshooting a zero inflation target by the same amount.” De Long (1999)
emphasizes that deflation is more fearful than inflation because (1) the nominal interest rate has a lower bound 
at zero; and (2) the resultant wealth transfer from debtors to creditors is likely to trigger disruption of the 
financial system.Looking at the empirical studies conducted in Japan, Kimura (1999), for 
example, shows that the hypothesis of downward rigidity of nominal wages is rejected
with data up to 1998, while the hypothesis is not rejected with data up to 1997. 
He then suggests two alternative interpretations of this result. The first is the 
possibility of the permanent disappearance of downward rigidity reflecting the fact
that the Japanese employment system, which is characterized by seniority payments
and lifetime commitments, started changing fundamentally, as a result of the 
introduction of performance-based payment schemes. The second is the temporary
disappearance of downward rigidity resulting from the fact that an extremely large
adverse shock to the economy induced a temporary reduction in nominal wages as 
an emergent measure. However, since no country has experienced a situation in
which near-zero inflation has continued for a long period of time, it is certainly still
too soon to come to any definite conclusion. We have to wait at least for several 
more years for accumulation of longer time-series before conducting an additional
estimation to find a definite answer.
2. Adverse effects on the financial system
Deflation undermines both the soundness of the financial system and the stability of
the economy. Unexpected deflation initiates the malfunctioning of financial interme-
diation through the adverse mechanisms of debt deflation and credit crunch.
19 The
former mechanism is an income transfer from debtors to creditors as a result of an
increase in the real value of debt due to unexpected deflation. Debtors have higher
expenditure propensity than creditors, resulting in a decline in aggregate demand.
The latter mechanism of credit crunch raises balance-sheet adjustments in response
to declining net worth for economic agents, leading to an increase in nonperforming
loans within the financial system. Under such circumstances, economic agents whose
capital base had been eroded became cautious in taking on risks and also in doing
business with counterparties whose capital base has been eroded, leading to a decline
in economic activity.
3. Upward bias in price indices
An upward bias in price indices is provoked because current price indices fail to
account for the dynamic nature of economic activity such as the changes in con-
sumers’ behavior in choosing between goods in response to relative price fluctuations,
the introduction of new goods, and the disappearance of old goods.
Straightforwardly, an upward bias in price indices has a direct implication for
price stability. Because of this upward bias, even if a central bank decided that its 
target for the “true” rate of inflation should be zero, the implied target for measured
inflation would have to be greater than zero. The existence of an upward bias in 
the CPI thus means that pursuing a zero measured inflation rate means that it is 
necessary to conduct a deflationary policy, thereby possibly resulting in a loss of 
economic welfare.
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19. For the discussions on debt deflation and credit crunch, Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983) respectively 
comprise the basic literature in these two issues.Shiratsuka (1999) estimates upward bias in the Japanese CPI at 0.9 percentage
point.
20 As shown in Table 1, however, the effect of upward bias in major industrial
countries ranges from 0.5 percentage point to 1.1 percentage points per year.
Although the accuracy of the estimate is not necessarily high due to the lack of 
existing studies in this field in Japan, it is reasonable to suppose that there exists 
some positive upward bias in Japan.
It should be noted that the magnitude of measurement error is deemed to change
according to economic conditions. For example, Shiratsuka (1999) demonstrates a
positive correlation between the rate of inflation and the impact of upper substitution
bias, indicating that the impact of the problems in price index formula construction
increase during high-inflation periods. In addition, the speed of technological
progress could vary over time. Thus, to accept a certain inflation rate as an upward
bias does not necessarily ensure welfare maximization in the economy, and could lead
to a loss of economic welfare. Bearing this point in mind, how measurement errors in
the price index change over time in relation to the business cycle is an important
issue awaiting solution.
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Table 1  Bias in the Consumer Price Index in Major Countries
Source of measurement error United States Japan Germany United  Canada Kingdom
Upper level substitution 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.05–0.10 0.10
Lower level substitution 0.25 0.10
New products/quality change 0.60 0.70 < 0.60 0.20–0.45 0.30
New outlets 0.10 0.10 < 0.10 0.10–0.25 0.07
Total 1.10 0.90 0.75 n.a. 0.50
(0.80–1.60) (0.35–2.00) (0.50–1.50) (0.35–0.80)
Note: “<” indicates estimated bias is lower than the figure in the table.
Sources: Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index (1996), Shiratsuka (1999),
Hoffmann (1998), Cunningham (1996), Crawford (1998).
4. Non-negativity constraints on nominal interest rates
Non-negativity constraints on nominal interest rates become increasingly important
in a very low-inflation environment. 
Monetary policy generally controls short-term nominal interest rates, while it is
the real rate that matters in terms of its effects on inflation and real economic activity.
Even if nominal short-term interest rates are kept constant, the effects of monetary
easing or tightening on economic activity will vary depending on the rise and fall of
the rate of inflation. Therefore, it is crucially important for monetary policy to adjust
the nominal interest rate in accordance with fluctuations in the rate of inflation, so as
to guide real interest rates consistently with the financial and economic conditions.
Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, a low level of nominal interest
rates leaves a central bank with very little room to lower interest rates when the 
20. Shiratsuka (1999) updates the estimation results of the upward bias in the Japanese CPI in Shiratsuka (1998).
The point estimate remains unchanged, while the upper limit is lowered from 2.35 percentage points per year to
2 percentage points, based on the revised estimation results on the substitution bias.economy faces deflationary pressure. In this case, it is highly possible that increased
deflationary pressure would rather result in an increase in real expected interest rates,
thereby leading to greater economic instability. 
Looking at Japan’s experience of the so-called zero interest rate policy, however, it is
evident that monetary policy maintains its effectiveness by affecting expectations.
More precisely, a zero interest rate policy can be regarded as an automatic stabilizer that
functions by promoting the smoother formation of market expectations regarding the
future course of monetary policy by announcing that it will commit to the zero rate
“until deflationary concerns are dispelled.” In this regard, if the economy is on a down-
ward trend, market participants believe that the termination of the zero interest rate
policy should be put off, thus bringing longer-term interest rates down to flatten the
yield curve. On the contrary, if the economy is on an upward trend, market partici-
pants believe that the termination should get closer, thus raising longer-term interest
rates to steepen the yield curve rise, acting as a brake on the monetary easing effect.
21
IV. Price Stability as an Objective of Monetary Policy
In this section, based on the discussion so far, I examine next what the desirable rate
of inflation is. I then discuss how this rate of inflation can be related to the practical
definition of price stability for monetary policy. 
A. Monetary Policy and the Desirable Rate of Inflation
As to the desirable rate of inflation, there is a lot of debate on whether it corresponds
to exactly zero measured inflation or to a small but positive rate of inflation.
22
1. Level of the desirable rate of inflation
There is growing attention to the debate over precisely what numerical value should
be targeted in an inflation-targeting regime.
23 The general consensus on this point 
in academic circles is that an inflation target should be some small but positive rate 
of measured inflation, obtained by adding a “margin for safety against the risk of
deflation” to a “true inflation of zero adjusted for the upward bias in price index”
(see, for example, Bernanke et al. [1999]).
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21. Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001) examine the Japan’s experience of monetary policy under zero interest rates
as well as additional measures for monetary easing beyond the so-called zero interest rate policy. Goodfriend
(2000) also investigates the policy options for a central bank under the non-negativity constraint on nominal
interest rates. 
22. Friedman’s rule, proposed by Friedman (1969), postulates that (1) efficient resource allocation requires that there
be a zero opportunity cost of holding money, i.e., zero nominal interest rates, implying price deflation at the
equivalent rate of the real interest rate in absolute terms; and (2) an optimal monetary policy to achieve efficient
resource allocation should steadily contract the money supply at a rate sufficient to bring the nominal interest
rate down to zero. See Woodford (1990) for a detailed survey of this issue. In contrast, Summers (1991) argues
that 2 or 3 percent inflation is desirable because of (1) the non-negativity constraint of nominal interest rates; 
(2) downward rigidity in nominal wage rates; and (3) the high possibility of equalizing the marginal costs and
benefits of inflation at a positive rate of inflation. Furthermore, S. Fischer (1996) emphasizes that it is best to 
target a rate of inflation in the range of 1 to 3 percent by pointing out the effects of upward bias in price indices
in addition to the first and second reasons suggested by Summers (1991). 
23. For details of the policy framework of inflation targeting, see, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and Bank of
Japan, Policy Planning Office (2000).With respect to the risk of deflation, there is a perception that monetary policy
should be conducted so as to prevent deflation from happening, taking into account
the fact that deflation is more difficult to deal with than inflation. 
As summarized in the previous section, it should be noted that there is a substan-
tial risk that deflationary pressure will be amplified in a low-inflation environment
due to difficulties of real wage adjustment and the adverse effects of debt deflation
and credit crunch. In addition, considering that nominal interest rates cannot be 
negative, low nominal interest rates leave very little room for a central bank to lower
interest rates to fend off a tremendous deflationary shock. This suggests the greater
possibility of raising real expected interest rates in the event of recession, thereby
leading to a higher risk of instability in the economy. 
However, it is necessary to examine the validity of the above argument in a 
disinflationary environment against the backdrop of productivity improvement. It is
often pointed out that the worldwide low-inflation environment, including that in
Japan, is induced by the improvement in productivity against the backdrop of the
revolution in information and telecommunications technology.
24
As examined in the previous section, quality changes and/or new product bias,
which stem largely from technological progress, are identified as constituting 
the largest source of the upward bias in the CPI in major industrial countries 
(see Table 1). An overestimation of “true” inflation is, to put it differently, an under-
estimation of productivity growth or economic growth. For example, if a price
decline is brought about by a downward shift of the aggregate supply curve as a result
of an increase in productivity, it is possible to argue that this downward pressure on
the general price level is acceptable (Figure 4). Even if the price index incorporates 
an upward bias of the same magnitude, the implication for monetary policy will 
differ according to the source of such bias.
Therefore, the question of what the desirable rate of inflation is, is not necessarily
an easy one for which one can find a clear answer in conditions of ongoing structural
change in the economy. In the next subsection, I examine this issue further, taking
account of its relationship with “sustainable price stability.”
2. The desirable rate of inflation and policy rules
The aforementioned discussions on the desirable rate of inflation do not have 
sufficient theoretical and empirical bases. However, the most important point in
these discussions is that regarding the rate of inflation which enables monetary policy
to respond effectively to various external shocks, thereby realizing a more efficient
combination of inflation and output variabilities in practice.
Recent literature on monetary policy rule frequently employs the “policy frontier,”
shown in Figure 5, as a criterion by which to evaluate the performance of monetary
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24. D. Fischer (1996) points out that the price development in 1820–96 was stable with steady economic growth
and called it “Victorian equilibrium,” as it approximately corresponds to the lifetime of Queen Victoria
(1819–1901). Looking at the GDP statistics in Mitchell (1988), it is clear that the average rate of real GDP
growth in 1830–96 remained at 2 percent per year, while nominal GDP growth was 1.8 percent per year, imply-
ing that GDP deflator declined annually by –0.2 percent. This indicates that zero inflation is not necessarily
inconsistent with the sustainable economic growth. policy rules (for example, see Taylor [1994]).
25 Changes in the weightings of the 
output gap and inflation in the policy reaction function affect the dynamic paths of
the output gap and inflation in relation to the long-run equilibrium values and thus
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25. The policy frontier is generally defined as the “variance trade-off” between the GDP gap and the inflation rate,
which is downward sloping and convex to the origin. However, for ease of discussion relating to “price stability,”
I plot output stability on the horizontal axis and inflation stability on the vertical axis, so that the trade-off curve
is reversed. Recent empirical analyses of monetary policy rules employ forward-looking econometric models to
evaluate the efficiency of monetary policy rules with deviations from the policy frontier. See Kamada and Muto
(2000) and Kimura and Tanemura (2000a) for empirical research in Japan. It should be noted that the policy
frontier is generally discussed in closed economic models, because effects stemming from the economic policy of
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Figure 5  Policy Frontierthe variances of these two variables (the inverse of the degree of stability). The policy
frontier is the locus of the most efficient pair of the degrees of stability in output gap
and inflation, which is convex to the top-right direction. This implies that a central
bank faces a policy trade-off in the sense that if the central bank wants to increase
inflation stability it must tolerate a decline in output stability.
In the economic model in which the assumption of classical dichotomy holds, the
target inflation rate does not affect the performance of economy, thus leaving 
the shape of the policy frontier unchanged. As examined in the previous section,
however, inflation is not neutral to economic fluctuations in the short run, and 
persistent inflation, even though it is moderate, produces considerable costs in the
form of an accumulation of distorted resource allocations. In addition, the risk of
economic instability varies as the target rate of inflation changes because of the 
non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates and downward rigidity of 
nominal wages. Therefore, the desirable rate of inflation in the short run can be
regarded as the rate of inflation that leads the economy to achieve the most efficient
combination of output and inflation stabilities on the policy frontier.
26
Furthermore, as pointed out in the previous section, inflation reduces mid- to 
long-term economic growth. This implies that reducing the rate of inflation and 
stabilizing the macroeconomic environment improve macroeconomic performance in
the medium to long run. In this sense, a desirable rate of inflation in the medium to
long run can be considered as the rate of inflation that enables the economy to expand
the policy frontier as much as possible, thus leading to more stability in both output
and inflation. The solid and upward-sloping arrow in Figure 5 illustrates this point.
B. Two Definitions of Price Stability
Given that there is a consensus that a small but positive rate of inflation is desirable,
how can we relate this idea to a practical definition of price stability as the objective
of monetary policy? Although a consensus has yet to be gained as to how we 
should define price stability in the context of monetary policy operations, it seems
reasonable to classify the views on price stability into two. 
The first definition enables one to specify price stability numerically so as to set a
tolerable target range for the inflation rate, such that “price stability corresponds to a
rate of inflation from 0 to 2 percent.” Let me call this approach to price stability
“measured price stability.” 
This approach can be interpreted as assuming that a central bank has a 
lexicographic ordering among policy objectives, among which price stability has 
primary importance, and considers other objectives only when the inflation rate
remains within the target range. Monetary policy is regarded as a failure when the
first priority objective (price stability) is off target, even though at the same 
time other objectives (for example, economic growth, employment) show good 
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26. The existing empirical literature on the evaluation of policy rules assumes that the classical dichotomy holds in
the long run, thus the shape of the policy frontier is independent of the inflation rate. In order to examine the
possibility that the policy frontier varies in accordance with the inflation rate, it is necessary to incorporate the
nonlinear response of real variables against the rate of inflation in the model. However, such an extension seems
to make the econometric model too complex and difficult to handle.performance. This approach emphasizes transparency in the sense that the goal of
monetary policy is clear, simple, and understandable. Accountability of a central
bank is ensured by its obligation to give a convincing rationale for its policy conduct,
especially in the case of missing a previously announced target. 
The second definition considers price stability to be an important basis for 
sustainable economic growth. This approach emphasizes the importance of achieving
a stable macroeconomic environment as a fundamental condition for sustainable
growth, rather than merely pursuing measured inflation using a particular price
index. Let me call this approach “sustainable price stability.”
27
This approach is deemed to be similar to setting a goal for avoiding large 
fluctuations in real economic activity and the general price level in the long run.
28
It can be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of stabilizing public expectations
regarding inflation, as a necessary condition for maximizing economic stability and
efficiency.
29 Price stability in itself is, however, a necessary but not sufficient condition
for sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, an important question is still left
open. That is, coupled with the fact that an operational definition of the inflation
rate necessary for sustainable economic growth is quite difficult to come up with, a
relevant question remains concerning “the price index that should be stabilized” even
as the central bank focuses on sustainable economic growth.
C. The Practical Interpretation of Price Stability
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the aforementioned two views on “price 
stability,” I examine the relationship with the policy frontier, and then carry out a
case study to determine how these two views on price stability can be interpreted in
the context of price development during the bubble period. 
1. The relationship with the policy frontier
First, let me summarize the two views on price stability in relation to the policy frontier.
From the viewpoint of single-minded targeting on inflation to pursue “measured
price stability” at any cost under conditions of lexicographic preference, there is no
trade-off between price stability and output stability. Or, more realistically to permit
the trade-off between price stability and output stability, the policy frontier is extremely
flat because the opportunity cost of improved output stability to compensate inflation
stability is very large. However, inflation-targeting countries do not assume such an
extreme preference in the trade-off between inflation stability and output stability. On
the contrary, inflation-targeting countries must be considered as employing “measured
price stability” as an indicator to help them to achieve “sustainable price stability.” 
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27. Since the notion of “sustainable price stability” refers to the importance of the sustained stability of inflation 
that is compatible with sustained economic growth, it does not necessarily correspond to the mere stability of
measured inflation at a particular level. In this sense, “sustained price stability” implies not only stability of the
rate of inflation but also the stability of inflation variability. 
28. Mieno (1994), the former Governor of the BOJ, stated during his lecture at the Kisaragi-kai in May 1994, “Price
stability does not mean the stability of price indices. Real price stability can be achieved when such stability is
backed by medium- to long-term, well-balanced, and sustainable economic growth.” 
29. For example, in an introductory speech at the August 1996 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium
entitled “Achieving Price Stability,” FRB Chairman Greenspan (1996) referred to an operational definition of
price stability from a central bankers’ point of reference: “Price stability obtains when economic agents no longer
take account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic decision making.”For example, Batini and Haldane (1999) point out that inflation-forecast-based
policy rules, which guide short-term interest rates in response to the inflation 
forecasts for three to six quarters ahead, help improve not only price stability but also
output stability.
30 This result is viewed as supporting evidence for the current frame-
work of the Bank of England to employ inflation forecasts for about two years ahead
as an intermediate target. If this interpretation is appropriate, it is the case that there
is no trade-off between price stability and output stability in the long run, and that,
in this case, two years is long enough to be considered as the long run in practice. 
The recent analyses of monetary policy rules conduct stochastic simulations 
on the various parameter sets of policy reaction functions. In this case, stochastic 
simulations give random shocks for a certain period of time that can be used to 
compute variances of time series of simulated output gaps and inflation rates. Then,
the simulations are repeated several hundred times and a pair of average of computed
variances calculated for each simulation. The procedure of stochastic simulations
implies that the performance of policy reaction functions is evaluated on the policy
frontier in terms of “sustainable price stability,” rather than “measured price stability.” 
This point is relevant to extracting a practical implication from the relationship
between the two. This is because the above empirical analysis casts some light on how
effectively various policy reaction functions stabilize macroeconomic performance in
the medium to long run, and provides a clue to understanding how long the
“medium to long run” is in practice. 
Although two views share an emphasis on the importance of pursuing sustainable
economic growth in the long run, their proponents think differently from each other
concerning the practical way to achieve it, thus putting different relative weights on
“measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.” More concretely, from the
viewpoint of the former, even though the central bank is expected to pursue price 
stability that is consistent with sustainable economic growth in the medium to long
run, it is necessary to establish a track record of maintaining stable inflation in the
short run by committing to the previously announced target for the inflation rate.
On the contrary, from the viewpoint of “sustainable price stability,” stabilization of
the inflation rate around the target rate using a specific price index at a particular
point in time is not sufficient to achieve price stability that supports sustainable 
economic growth in the long run.
The above interpretation of the two views on price stability seems consistent with
the following historical fact. That is, inflation targeting was initially introduced in
countries where macroeconomic performance had deteriorated and, as a result, the
central bank was required to establish a credible commitment to price stability.
2. Japan’s experience of the bubble era
In order to put the difference between the two views on “price stability” into 
perspective, it may be useful to conduct a case study regarding how such views are 
interpreted in regard to price development in the second half of the 1980s, based on
the discussion of Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001). 
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30. Kimura and Tanemura (2000a) show the possibility that an inflation-forecast-based policy rule which responds to
the inflation forecast for six quarters ahead can stabilize both inflation and the output gap simultaneously in Japan.At the time of the bubble period,
31 the CPI had been extremely stable until
around 1987, started to rise gradually in 1988, and the year-on-year increase was still
1.1 percent in March 1989, immediately before the introduction of the consumption
tax (Figure 6). The year-on-year increase in the CPI, adjusted for the impact of 
consumption tax, continued to rise after April 1989, and it reached 2 percent in
April 1990 and 3 percent in November 1990. 
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31. Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) define the bubble period as the period from 1987 to 1990, from 
the viewpoint of coexistence of three factors of bubble economy, that is, a marked increase in asset prices, an
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Figure 6  Price Development
First, looking at this price development from the viewpoint of “measured price
stability,” two evaluations are possible: (1) prices eventually rose substantially toward
the end of the bubble period, compared with the recent level of inflation; and 
(2) price stability had not been undermined in comparison with the figure before the
bubble period. The difference between the two evaluations, so to speak, boils down
to the question of what can be regarded as a tolerable rate of inflation, and there can
be a variety of answers to this question.
However, if one looks back at Japan’s experience since the bubble period from 
the viewpoint of “sustainable price stability,” it can be seen that Japan’s economy
experienced a decline in inflation and faced the risk of tumbling into a deflationary
spiral. Thus, it is crucial to determine a way of evaluating the fact that such deflation
Notes: 1. Figures are adjusted for the impact of consumption tax.
2. Regarding the CPI, annualized changes from a month earlier are computed
from a seasonally adjusted series applied by the X-12-ARIMA with the
options as follows:
Estimation period: From January 1980 to December 1998
ARIMA model:       (0 1 1)(0 1 1)12
Level adjustment: April 1989 (introduction of consumption tax) and April
1997 (consumption tax hike)
Source: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications,
Consumer Price Index.occurred as a result of the emergence of the bubble economy in the second half of the
1980s. In this context, as Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) point out, “it
seems more important to consider whether price stability is sustainable over the long
run, instead of discussing whether prices had been stable during the bubble period.
According to this view, it might be possible to assess that Japan’s economy did not
succeed in sustaining price stability after the bubble period.” In other words, this 
suggests the importance of evaluating the sustainability of price stability over a fairly
long period.
So how can the above summary of economic performance since the second half of
the 1980s be evaluated from the viewpoint of output stability and price stability?
Figure 7 is a scatter diagram showing the root mean squared deviations
32 of CPI 
inflation (vertical axis) and real GDP growth (horizontal axis) from their target values
(CPI inflation for 1.5 percent and real GDP growth for 2.5 percent) for the five-year
and 15-year subsample periods
33 from 1980. This picture shows Japan’s realized 
economic performance on the policy frontier. The plot of the 15-year subsample
period is relatively stable, compared with large fluctuations in the plot of the five-year
subsample period. Moreover, the plot of the five-year subsample period shifts inside
the plot of the 15-year subsample period in the second half of 1990, while it is
located outside it before then, implying that there was a significant deterioration in
macroeconomic stability. This deteriorating economic performance can be also seen
in the plot of the 15-year subsample period. 
A closer look at this figure also offers the following observations. First, observa-
tions for the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, which largely covers 
the bubble period, are concentrated in the upper left area, implying that resultant
economic performance was poor due to the remarkable swing in business conditions.
Second, the plots of both root mean squared deviations and standard deviations for 
the 15-year subsample period exhibit lower output stability than inflation stability, 
while both show similar shapes. These observations support the argument in Okina,
Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) that Japan’s economy did not sufficiently succeed
in sustaining price stability after the bubble period. 
The experience of the bubble period seems to suggest the importance of “the 
sustainability of price stability over a fairly long period.” This contrasts with the
aforementioned empirical results in the United Kingdom that indicate the inflation-
forecast-based policy rule, which adjusts short-term interest rates in response to 
the inflation forecasts for three to six quarters ahead, helps improve not only price
stability but also output stability. 
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32. The root mean squared deviation is computed as follows: compute the first mean value of squared deviations of
the inflation rate from its target rate, and then take the root value. This corresponds to the root mean square
error around the target value of inflation. 
33. In this analysis, five-year and 15-year subsample periods illustrate the duration of a business cycle and the period
from emergence to collapse of the asset price bubble, respectively.V. Price Stability and the Framework for Monetary Policy
Conduct
As a next step, I examine the issues regarding the practical framework for the conduct
of monetary policy, based on the above summary of ideas about price stability. 
A. The Relationship between the Two Views on Price Stability
Under the Bank of Japan Law, the BOJ is required to pursue sound development of
the national economy by maintaining price stability. This can be taken to mean that,
on the one hand, the BOJ is required to pursue price stability, an aim which is in
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Figure 7  Economic Performance since the 1980s
Notes: Measures for output stability and inflation stability are computed as follows: 
Five-year subsample: Inverse of root mean squared deviation from target 
values (2.5 percent for real GDP growth and 1.5 percent for CPI
inflation) for the five-year subsample period.
15-year subsample: Inverse of root mean squared deviation from target values
(2.5 percent for real GDP growth and 1.5 percent for CPI inflation)
for the 15-year subsample period.
15-year subsample (stdv): Inverse of standard deviation of real GDP growth
and CPI inflation for the 15-year subsample period.
Sources: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications,
Consumer Price Index; Cabinet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts.itself based on certain criteria from the viewpoint of understandability, and, on the
other hand, it is also required to ensure stability of the economy as a prerequisite for
the basis for medium- to long-term economic growth. 
Of course, as the notion of “sustainable price stability” keeps future price develop-
ments strongly in mind, it is not necessarily equivalent to a low measured inflation
rate at a particular point in time. In this context, the relevant question in practice is
how to relate “measured price stability” to “sustainable price stability.”
34
1. Difficulties in interpreting “measured price stability”
“Measured price stability” is defined by observed movements in various inflation
indicators, such as the CPI, the WPI, and the GDP deflator. However, since move-
ments of such indicators are affected by various temporary shocks and measurement
errors, it is indeed quite difficult to gauge the underlying inflation trend. For 
example, it might be the case that statistically measured inflation appears highly
volatile at a glance, while most of the effects are just temporary. On the contrary, it
might also be the case that measured inflation remains stable, even though the
changed underlying inflation trend is offset by temporary shocks.
35 Furthermore, 
the magnitude of measurement errors in price indices is likely to vary according to
the current economic conditions and the pace of technological innovation.
Consequently, since it is indeed quite a difficult issue to assess whether the 
basis for price stability is maintained solely by observing the movement in inflation
indicators, it is not easy to specify numerically the desirable inflation rate. In other
words, if one wishes to set a numerical target in pursuing “measured price stability,”
one should be ready to answer questions concerning the consistency of this numerical
target with “sustainable price stability,” which is considered as the ultimate goal for
monetary policy. 
2. Analysis intended to promote a more appropriate interpretation of “measured
price stability”
In this regard, it is important to adjust the impact of temporary or transitory shocks
to extract the cycle and trend components of underlying inflation movements. 
Regarding the former component, Shiratsuka (1997) and Mio and Higo (1999)
empirically show that the trimmed mean estimator, which excludes the impacts of items
located on both tails of the cross-sectional distribution of inflation, adequately adjusts
for the impact of temporary shocks, and could well be a quite useful and powerful 
indicator with which to gauge the changes in underlying inflation fluctuations.
36
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34. It should be noted that the notion of “sustainable price stability” could vary, reflecting public perceptions on
inflation at the time. Therefore, during the transitional period of such sentiment, it might become increasingly
difficult for a central bank to transmit its intentions to the markets. 
35. For example, the price development during which the prices of fresh food fluctuate up and down markedly due
to bad weather corresponds to the former case in which “statistically measured inflation is highly volatile at a
glance, while most of the effects are just temporary.” On the contrary, the price development during which the
upward pressure on the price level is offset by “safety valve effects,” such that declining prices for imported raw
materials and expanded production capacity due to yen appreciation and increased imports correspond to the 
latter case in which “measured inflation remains stable, even though the changed underlying inflation trend is
offset by temporary shocks.” 
36. For the empirical research in the United States, see, for example, Bryan and Cecchetti (1994).For example, Shiratsuka (1997) suggests that the trimmed mean estimator is 
useful in adjusting for the effects of various temporary shocks and in gauging 
the underlying inflation fluctuations. In particular, the level and direction of the 
underlying inflation fluctuations become more evident when the trimmed mean 
estimator is used in combination with the overall CPI (or the overall CPI excluding
fresh food). As shown in Figure 8, if one focuses on the four points of time that 
correspond to the first oil crisis, the second oil crisis, the yen appreciation phase after
the Plaza Accord, and the yen appreciation in 1995, a comparison of the headline
CPI and the trimmed mean estimator clearly indicates those occasions on which large
external shocks affected a very limited range of goods and services (the second oil 
crisis and the yen appreciation after the Plaza Accord) and those occasions on which
they affected a fairly wide range of goods and services (the first oil crisis and the yen
appreciation in 1995). 
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Source: Figure 8 in Shiratsuka (1997).
Figure 8  Trimmed Mean Estimator
As to the latter component of trend movements, the important point to be 
examined is how to evaluate the inflationary pressure or the potential output level by
taking account of structural changes of uncertain magnitude and timing. 
A typical question in this line is how to evaluate the impact of an upward shift 
in the potential growth rate, as evidenced in the argument surrounding the “New
Economy.” Oliner and Sichel (2000) apply the analytical framework of growth
accounting to quantify the impacts of information and telecommunications 
evolution in recent years, and show that two-thirds of the increase in labor productiv-
ity between the 1991–95 to 1995–99 periods is attributable to capital accumulation
in the form of personal computers and information networks as well as increased 
productivity in the manufacture of intermediate goods such as semiconductors. 
Some caution, however, is in order when interpreting the above estimation results.
It is hard to deny that the estimated increase in the productivity trend growth is likely
to be affected by cyclical factors, because the U.S. economy in the latter half of the
1990s enjoyed a long-lasting expansion. In this sense, it is indeed difficult to identifyadequately how the structural changes are ongoing on a real-time basis.
37
3. Consistency between “measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability”
The above discussion indicates that “measured price stability” does not necessarily
contribute to “sustainable price stability,” even though a central bank may be able 
to accomplish the former for a while. More precisely, if a central bank attempts to
constrain measured inflation into too narrow a range, the economy may be pushed
toward a boom-bust cycle.
A case in point is New Zealand in 1995–96, which was the first country to
announce a strict commitment to “measured price stability” through inflation target-
ing (Figure 9). Even though monetary policy in New Zealand was tight throughout
1995 and 1996, inflation remained slightly above the previously announced upper
limit of 2 percent in 1996. This tight policy led to high real interest rates and a rising
real exchange rate, causing harm to the real economy. As a result, on December 10,
1996, the target range of inflation was widened from 0–2 percent to 0–3 percent
(see, for example, Brash [2000] and Bernanke et al. [1999]).
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37. It should be noted that one important assumption for the Taylor rule to apply is that the potential growth rate
remains unchanged, and this assumption might not always hold. In fact, Orphanides et al. (1999) pointed out
that measurement errors in the GDP gap, stemming from ex post revision of the statistics, are so large that policy
judgments could be different if real-time data were used instead of ex post revised data. See also Kamada and
Masuda (2001) for the case in Japan on this issue.
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Figure 9  Economic Development in New Zealand
Furthermore, as mentioned above, looking at Japan’s economic development 
since the second half of the 1980s, it might well be a case of serious conflict between
“measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.” On the one hand, the 
general price level showed a stable movement and “measured price stability” seemed
to be maintained during this period. However, on the other hand, as an aftermath of
the asset price bubble at a time of stable price development, asset prices declinedremarkably and the business cycle was amplified in the 1990s. In particular, Japan’s
economy has been brought to the verge of a deflationary spiral.
Taking account of these experiences, it is important to note the possibility that
the simultaneous requirement of achieving “sustainable price stability” and strictly
committing to “measured price stability” might become difficult at times. 
B. A Framework for Ensuring Consistency between the Two Definitions 
of Price Stability
The above episodes clearly show that consistency between “measured price stability”
and “sustainable price stability” is not automatically ensured in practice. It should be
stressed, however, that the latter is the primary goal for monetary policy and should
never be hampered by pursuit of the former. To this end, a central bank is required to
accomplish “sustainable price stability” in the first place, and, at the same time, is also
required to maintain policy credibility that is based on committing itself to “measured
price stability” according to certain criteria. Therefore, a desirable framework for 
the conduct of monetary policy is deemed to balance the two so as to achieve 
compatibility between flexible policy responses and a high degree of transparency. 
1. The conduct of monetary policy under conditions of structural change
Compatibility between “sustainable price stability” and “measured price stability”
becomes a critical problem when fundamental structural changes in the economy 
are under way.
For example, Meyer (2000) states that a major challenge for U.S. monetary policy
at the moment is “to allow the economy to realize the full benefits of the new possi-
bilities while avoiding an overheated economy.” He also emphasizes the importance
of possible changes in aggregate supply and in trend growth in the evaluation of
inflationary pressure. More precisely, taking account of the recent development in
monetary policy rules under uncertainty, he emphasizes the following three points:
(1) the estimate of the output gap should be updated on the basis of all available
data; (2) the aggressiveness of response to the output gap should be adjusted in light
of the uncertainty about their measurement; and (3) policy becomes less preemptive
and more aggressively reactive as the degree of uncertainty about the output gap rises.
Furthermore, Meyer (2000) points out that the current strategy can be viewed as “a
nonlinear Taylor rule under uncertainty,” which is illustrated in Figure 10. That is,
although the response to the output gap is attenuated in a region around the best 
estimate of potential output, the policy response should become more aggressive once
the output gap moves sufficiently below or above the best estimate of the neutral level.
The nonlinear Taylor rule can be regarded as an application of the “opportunistic
approach”
38 to policy evaluation of the output gap, which is a preemptive component
in a Taylor-type policy reaction function.
39
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38. The opportunistic approach is the notion that, while maintaining price stability as the ultimate goal of monetary
policy, monetary authorities should refrain from taking rough-and-ready policy responses considering the possi-
bility of favorable external shocks on inflation if and when the inflation rate is at the level not so divergent from
the long-term objective level, or is not likely to diverge from the current level. For details, see Orphanides and
Wilcox (1996). 
39. It should be noted that the range of attenuation should be updated asymmetrically, reflecting subjective risk
assessment on upward and downward risks in economic forecasting.In this context, FRB Chairman Greenspan (1997) said that the conduct of 
monetary policy might naturally be discretionary in circumstances in which 
economic restructuring has been drastically effected. We cannot forecast the future
course of the economy precisely if we just apply the historical relationships among
various economic factors, because they are highly likely to have been altered as a 
consequence of structural changes. In pursuing the policy objective of sustainable
growth by maintaining price stability, it is not sufficient to follow any one mechani-
cal rule based on previous relationships. Ad hoc or discretionary policy based on 
tentative decisions without any coherent criteria are problematic because such a 
policy is vulnerable to political pressure.
2. A framework for monetary policy with constrained discretion
The next question we must ask is what kind of approach exists regarding the future
framework for implementing monetary policy in Japan, which constrains discretion
and is based on coherent criteria for policy judgment. In the following, we will 
examine this issue, by focusing on the idea of “constrained discretion.” 
For example, a policy regime of inflation targeting is regarded as a typical practice
of “constrained discretion.” In order to achieve consistency between the two views
regarding price stability, the inflation-targeting regime commits to the previously
announced inflation target, as well as permitting short-run deviations from inflation
targets in response to large external shocks. More concretely, short-run policy flexi-
bility is maintained by predetermined escape clauses and/or ex post explanation to the
public.
40 In this sense, the introduction of inflation targeting is not equivalent to a
mere announcement of a commitment to the numerical inflation target. Therefore,
inflation targeting is one of the policy frameworks designed to maintain policy 










































Figure 10  Nonlinear Taylor Rule (Illustration)
40. For measures designed to deal with the situation when inflation breaches a target threshold, see, for example,
Bank of Japan, Policy Planning Office (2000) and Bernanke et al. (1999).flexibility with a high degree of transparency by properly ensuring consistency
between “measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability.”
It should be stressed that inflation targeting is not the only way to produce a
desirable policy framework. A desirable policy framework would vary, depending on
what kinds of communication measures are important in ensuring accountability by
showing a quantitative assessment of “measured price stability,” while pursuing the
“sustainable price stability” as the primary objective for monetary policy.
41
From this viewpoint, the question as to what is a desirable style for the BOJ’s 
monetary policy does not boil down to a question of whether inflation targeting
should be adopted or not.
42 The current policy framework adopted by the BOJ can be
viewed as aiming at “constrained discretion” by restricting complete discretion under
open independence. In other words, this process is expected to lead to the achievement
of consistency between “measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability,” by
taking account of the characteristics of Japan’s social and economic systems.
43
VI. Conclusion
This paper first summarized the academic knowledge on the benefits of price stability,
then examined the desirable rate of inflation in practice. The paper also proposed two
views on price stability—“measured price stability” and “sustainable price stability”—
and discussed their policy implications. 
What needs to be emphasized concerning the relationship between the two views
on price stability is that central banks should pursue “sustainable price stability” in
the first place as the fundamental and primary goal of monetary policy. It should be
noted at the same time, from the viewpoint of accountability, that “measured price
stability” is also important as a quantitative yardstick with which to evaluate policy
achievement. However, the former must not be undermined in the pursuit of the 
latter, because the former is essential to the economy. 
In this regard, the BOJ currently tries to establish a framework for implementing
monetary policy in the middle of two extreme approaches of “strict rule” and 
“pure discretion” by restricting discretion under open independence. Such a policy
framework can be viewed as “constrained discretion,” which is in line with the 
basic philosophy of inflation targeting. In doing so, it is crucially important to 
consider proper consistency between “measured price stability” and “sustainable price 
stability,” based on the social and economic environment in Japan.
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41. It should be noted that the idea exists that publication of all information regarding monetary policy is not 
necessarily desirable as a communication strategy to enhance the transparency of economic policy. For example,
Noyer (2000) states, in reply to the criticism that the European Central Bank lacks policy transparency, “It is
[therefore] important to judge carefully the contribution which the various elements of communication can make
to the fulfillment of the primary objective of monetary policy.” He also points out that “publishing forecasts might
finally increase uncertainty and even complicate the maintenance of price stability,” since economic forecasts
should be evaluated appropriately in consideration of internal risks and uncertainty under structural reform.
42. See Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001) for details regarding this point. 
43. Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the FRB, states that “when people suggested to me that the Fed should be 
content with 3 percent inflation, I answered that the Federal Reserve Act calls for ‘stable prices,’ not ‘pretty low
inflation.’ If citizens think that’s wrong, they should get the law changed” (Blinder [1998, p. 67]).APPENDIX 1: MONEY DEMAND AND COST OF INFLATION
In Appendix 1, I quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of “shoe leather” cost by 
estimating the money demand function using long-run historical data, which is a
classical question stemming from the contribution of Bailey (1956). More precisely,
provided that the observed nominal short-term interest rate contains the expected
inflation rate due to the Fisher effect, I estimate the increment of consumer surplus
when expected inflation is zero and the nominal short-term interest rate is equal to
equilibrium real short-term interest rates.
First, let m(r) be the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP, m, expressed as a function of
nominal short-term interest rate r. In this case, “shoe leather” cost w(r) measured 
as the dead weight loss of money demand function, shown in Figure 2, is written 
as follows: 
r
w(r) = ∫ m(x)dx – rm(r). (A.1)
0
Assume that the money demand function is a log-log type as follows:
m(r) = Ar
–η . (A.2)




1–η . (A.3) 1 – η
Next, Appendix Figure 1 is a scatter diagram showing the ratio of real balance to
real income (vertical axis) and the nominal short-term interest rate (horizontal axis). 
In this figure, I use M1 as currency outstanding and the call rate as the short-term
nominal interest rate (I use the official discount rate before 1969).
45
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the estimation results of money demand function in
equation (A.2).
46 Looking at the elasticity of the interest rate η across the different 
sample periods, it is estimated at –0.11 in the full sample period, –0.25 in the 
samples before World War II (pre-WWII subsample), and –0.10 in the samples after
World War II (post-WWII subsample 1). In the post-WWII samples, elasticity slightly
declines to –0.09, if the samples after 1996, when the nominal short-term interest rate
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44. Lucas (2000) employs the semi-log functional form as well as the log-log one expressed as equation (A.1).
However, the semi-log functional form does not fit Japanese data well, exhibiting an almost linear shape.
Therefore, I do not use that formula in this paper. 
45. The details of the data used in this estimation are as follows: 
(1) As the outstanding amount of nominal money, the current M1 series is used since 1955. Before 1954, the
estimate of Fujino (1994), which is consistent with the current series, is used except for the missing period of
1941–50. For 1941–50, I interpolate missing values based on the estimate of Asakura and Nishiyama (1974). 
(2) Nominal GDP is a current series since 1955, and Ohkawa et al. (1974) is used up to 1954. 
(3) The nominal short-term interest rate is a concatenation of the following series: the overnight uncollateralized
call rate from 1986 to 1999; the overnight collateralized call rate from 1970 to 1985; and the official discount
rate before 1969.
46. Lucas (2000) assumes some plausible values for interest rate elasticity of the money demand function, and 
estimates the constant term so that the money demand function passes through the geometric means of the data
pairs of the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP ratio and nominal short-term interest rates.77
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Notes: 1. The details of data plotted in the figure are as follows (wartime data from 
1937 to 1949 are excluded): 
M1 before 1954 is estimates of Fujino (1994), except for 1941–50, and 
approximation based on Asakura and Nishiyama (1974) for 1941–50. 
Real GDP is taken from Ohkawa et al. (1974), retroactive for the series 
before 1955. 
Nominal short-term interest rates are the concatenation of the following 
three rates: (1) the uncollateralized overnight call rate from 1986 to 
1999; (2) the collateralized overnight call rate from 1970 to 1985; and 
(3) the official discount rate before 1969. 
2. Subsample periods of post-WWII 1 and 2 correspond to the periods from 
1950 to 1999, and from 1950 to 1993, respectively.
Sources: Asakura and Nishiyama (1974), Fujino (1994), Ohkawa et al. (1974), and 
Cabnet Office, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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Appendix Figure 1  Japan’s Money Demand from 1885 to 1999
Appendix Table 1  Money Demand Function
Full sample Pre-WWII subsample Post-WWII subsample 1 Post-WWII subsample 2
1885–1936; 1950–99 1885–1936 1950–99 1950–95
A –1.552 (0.005)*** –1.901 (0.455)*** –1.508 (0.055)*** –1.477 (0.168)***
µ –0.115 (0.012)*** –0.252 (0.179) –0.104 (0.011)*** –0.093 (0.060)
Adj. R
2 0.340 0.059 0.541 0.051
D.W. 0.386 0.382 0.232 0.205
White test 9.521 [0.000] 6.342 [0.042] 3.394 [0.183] 1.088 [0.581]
B-G test 63.254 [0.000] 32.261 [0.000] 31.324 [0.000] 32.088 [0.000]
Sample 102 52 50 44
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses, and p-values in brackets. Standard errors are autocorrelation-
heteroscedasticity robust estimators computed by Newey and West’s (1987) procedure. 
2. Post-WWII subsamples1and 2 are estimated using the sample period of 1950–99, and 1950–95, respectively.was below 1 percent, are excluded (post-WWII subsample 2). Although interest 
rate elasticity varies depending on the sample periods chosen, estimated interest rate 
elasticities are very similar in the post-WWII subsamples, regardless of the inclusion 
of recent samples of virtually zero nominal short-term interest rates.
47
The upper panel of Appendix Figure 2 displays the relation between the nominal
short-term interest rate and the welfare cost, estimated by equation (A.3) with the
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[1] Welfare Cost Function
[2] Welfare Loss Relative to Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate of 2 Percent
47. Equation (A.2) implies that the money demand function is estimated by restricting income elasticity to one. In
order to check the impact of this restriction, I employ the three-stage least squares procedure, proposed in Hsiao
and Fujiki (1998) to estimate the money demand function for 1950–99. The long-run interest rate and income
elasticity is estimated at –0.135 and 0.922, respectively, showing a very close value to the estimation results shown
in Appendix Table 1.estimated parameters shown in Appendix Table 1. The lower panel plots welfare
changes relative to the 2.5 percent interest rate that I use as the equilibrium real short-
term interest rate. These estimation results indicate that “shoe leather” cost is very
small, that is, that the gain from reducing the annual inflation rate from 10 percent to
zero is equivalent to an increase in real income of 0.3 percent, since the interest rate
elasticity of the money demand function is the very small value of –0.1. However, even
if one assumes interest rate elasticity to be –0.25, which corresponds to the estimate for
the pre-WWII period, the welfare loss is limited to 0.7 percent of real GDP. 
APPENDIX 2: RELATIVE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND THE RATE
OF INFLATION
In Appendix 2, I empirically examine the relationship between relative price fluctua-
tions and rate of inflation.
As we showed in Figure 3, a positive correlation was observed between relative
price fluctuations and the rate of inflation.
48 However, this correlation is significant
for the higher inflation subsample, while it becomes insignificant for the lower infla-
tion subsample. As pointed out in the text, this relationship suggests the following
possibility: relative price fluctuations work well as a signal for resource allocation
when inflation is low, while it is increasingly difficult to distinguish relative price
fluctuations from changes in the general price level as inflation becomes high.
In this regard, the critical rate of inflation at which the correlation between relative
price fluctuations and the rate of inflation becomes significant needs to be determined.
I thus estimate the following equation repeatedly by moving up the border rate of
inflation for the sample period from January 1971 to April 2000:
RPV = α 1 + α 2*DUM + β 1*INF + β 2*DUM *INF + ε , (A.4)
where RPV is relative price fluctuations measured by the standard deviations of CPI
item inflation rate, INF is the CPI inflation rate, DUM is the dummy variable for
higher inflation subsample, and ε is the error term.
Then, by focusing on the estimated parameter on CPI inflation, the following 
two points are examined: (1) How high is the CPI inflation rate when the deviation
from zero of the estimated parameter β 1, which captures the relation between relative
price variability and CPI inflation in the lower inflation subsample, is at a statistically 
significant level? (2) How high is the CPI inflation rate when the estimated parameter
β 1+ β 2 is statistically indifferent from β 1, or β 2 becomes statistically insignificant?
49
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48. For details of the data, see Footnote 12. The overall CPI inflation rate here is defined as the weighted arithmetic
mean of the inflation rate of 88 items, thus corresponding approximately to the geometric mean of item CPIs at
the index level. Therefore, it should be noted that overall CPI inflation is lower than the official index by the
amount of upward bias in the CPI caused by the index formula problem. 
49. It should be noted that the empirical exercise in this appendix is not intended to examine the causal relation
between the rate of inflation and relative price variability. In this regard, Mio and Higo (1999) examine changes
in the cross-sectional distribution of price changes, and point out that the changes in relative prices are mainly
caused by idiosyncratic and temporary relative price shocks.Appendix Figure 3 plots the estimated parameters β 1 and  β 1 + β 2, and their 
95 percent confidence intervals as well as the bordered CPI inflation between high-
and low-inflation subsamples.
50 The former CPI inflation, which corresponds to the
rate when the positive relation between CPI inflation and relative price variability
becomes statistically significant, is estimated at 2.7 percent. The latter CPI inflation,
which corresponds to the rate when the difference between higher- and lower-inflation
subsamples becomes statistically insignificant, is 5.6 percent. Although these estima-
tion results vary slightly, depending on subsample periods, the general conclusions that
the former critical inflation rate is around 3 percent and the latter critical inflation rate
is 5 to 6 percent remain unchanged. 
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50. The confidence interval for the estimated parameter is computed from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors






















Note: I repeatedly estimate the regression equation of relative price variability and 
the inflation rate as follows:
RPV =   1 +   2*DUM +   1*INF +   2*DUM *INF +
RPV:  Relative price variability (weighted standard deviations of CPI 
inflation in items)
DUM: Dummy variable for high-inflation subsample
INF:   CPI inflation
by changing the boundary rate of inflation for lower and higher inflation 
subsamples, and plot estimated parameters   1 and   1 +   2. I use a 
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